Former Military President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida thursday launched his autobiography, titled “A Journey in Service”, at the Transcorp Hilton Hotel in Abuja. The event also served as a fundraising ceremony for the IBB Presidential Library Project.
As the book became the major talkpoint across Nigeria since Thursday, TheWest Newspaper has pulled out 20 key points from the autobiography, specifically concerning the June 12, 1993 election and its aftermath:
Here are 20 key quotes from IBB’s book about the June 12 election, along with the corresponding page numbers:
1. “On Saturday, June 12, 1993, the Presidential elections took place as planned. To my surprise, the polls were not just peaceful but very peaceful indeed! Voting took place in all the 110,000 polling stations in the country, and in keeping with the Modified Open Ballot System (MOBS) as stipulated in Decree 13, counting took place flawlessly in the open.” (p. 275)
2. “By early May 1993, we all seemed ready for the June 12 Presidential elections. The structures were in place, and Nigerians had high hopes for the transition to democracy.” (p. 267)
3. “We were firmly committed to handing over power to an elected civilian winner of the June 12 elections, and all our plans revolved around that goal.” (p. 267)
4. “Using a giant board in front of its Abuja offices, NEC started, as early as June 13, to display already-released results from all 30 State Headquarters of NEC before the Resident Electoral Commissioners brought them to Abuja for final ratification.” (p. 275)
5, “Then, on June 16, without my knowledge or prior approval, NEC Chairman, Professor Nwosu, announced the suspension of the June 12 election results ‘until further notice’.” (p. 275)
6, “The stoppage of the announcement of results led to a national stalemate and confusion, which was compounded by a flurry of protests from different sectors of society.” (p. 275)
7. “Almost overwhelmed by a looming national crisis of unimaginable dimension, I withdrew to my home in Minna to reflect and hold a series of meetings with various people, within and outside the military, on the situation.” (p. 276)
8. “On the morning of June 23, I left Abuja for Katsina to commiserate with the Yar’Adua family. As I got ready to leave, a report filtered to me that the June 12 elections had been annulled. I would later find out that the ‘forces’ led by General Sani Abacha annulled the elections. There and then, I knew I was caught between ‘the devil and the deep blue sea’!! …Even Admiral Aikhomu, whose press secretary, Irabor, had announced the annulment, was horrified.” (p. 276)
9. “Even more bizarre was the extent of the annulment because it terminated all court proceedings regarding the June 12 elections, repealed all the decrees governing the Transition, and even suspended NEC!” (p. 276)
10. “Yes, during the stalemate that followed the termination of the results announcement, the possibility of annulment that could lead to fresh elections was loosely broached in passing. But annulment was only a component of a series of other options.” (p. 276)
11. “I remember saying: ‘These nefarious ‘inside’ forces opposed to the elections have outflanked me!’ I would later find out that the ‘forces’ led by General Sani Abacha annulled the elections. There and then, I knew I was caught between ‘the devil and the deep blue sea’!!” (p. 276)
12. “Following the annulment, the country was engulfed in one of its worst political crises ever. The sit-at-home campaign organised by the Campaign for Democracy (CD) led to the shut-down of shops and marketplaces and completely paralysed Lagos and much of the southwest.” (p. 277)
13. “The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) was joined by the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) in the protests. Within the military leadership, there was palpable outrage.” (p. 277)
14. “Some persons indeed expressed their reservations about an Abiola presidency before the elections. There were times when, deep down inside me, even I feared that Abiola might not be an effective president.” (p. 277)
15. “However, having allowed the process to go ahead in which Abiola appeared to have emerged victorious in an election deemed the freest and fairest in our country’s history, I was committed to ensuring that the results should stand.” (p. 277)
16, “The military was factionalised into rival groups between those opposed to the transition to civil rule, particularly an Abiola presidency, and those who thought the military should keep its word and hand over to a democratically elected government.” (p. 278)
17, “At one of my several meetings with Abiola, arranged this time by some traditional leaders, I offered Abiola an interim position pending when we could resolve the situation. Not surprisingly, Abiola turned down my offer.”
“I read somewhere, I believe, in one of Abiola’s newspapers that Abiola thought that the moment these ‘friends’ overthrew me, the elections would be de-annulled and that he would be installed as President by his ‘coup-plotting friends’.” (p. 278)
18. “Although I am on record to have stated after the elections that Abiola may not have won the elections, upon deeper reflection and a closer examination of all the available facts, there was no doubt that MKO Abiola won the June 12 elections.”
“In my speech on June 26, tepid and disingenuous as it may seem, I attempted to ‘justify’ the annulment in the face of supposed nationwide ‘widespread electoral malpractices’ during the elections!”
“In my speech on June 26, tepid and disingenuous as it may seem, I attempted to ‘justify’ the annulment in the face of supposed nationwide ‘widespread electoral malpractices’ during the elections!” (p. 278)
“It was painful for me to discover later that apart from Abacha, some of my closest colleagues, particularly a Lt-General, were knee-deep in the plot to eliminate me.” (p. 278)
19. “Upon closer examination of the original collated figures from the 110,000 polling booths nationwide, it was clear that he satisfied the two main constitutional requirements for winning the Presidential elections, mainly majority votes and geographical spread.” (p. 287)
“The annulment was not for Babangida to stay in office. This much I can say to you.” (p. 335)
“Without question, one of my biggest headaches at this time was Sani Abacha. I knew that Abacha was ambivalent about a return to civil rule.” (p. 278).
20. . “Faced with the circumstances of those moments, as President and Commander-in-Chief, painful as it seemed, I did what was in the country’s best interest, for which I take full responsibility.” (p. 287).
